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Click-Work or Click-Play: Crowdsourcing and the Work-Leisure Distinction  
Joseph A. Armenti

 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The digital economy has created new forms of work, play, and value.
1
  A site like 
Facebook may be worth tens of billions of dollars—almost entirely because its hundreds of 
millions of users spend time on it sharing, commenting, and curating.  Some platforms convert 
such “clicking” activities into opportunities for payment.  For example,, firms conduct market 
research through crowdsourcing platforms by asking users to rate images for adult content or 
review Tweets.  The firm benefits from the labor while the user is paid  five cents upon 
completion of the task.  Should traditional labor law apply to these activities?  Or are they a form 
of paid leisure, impossible (or undesirable) to regulate? 
 With the advent of the internet, virtual work forums have emerged as a unique medium 
for these conflicting interests.  Over the past several years, there has been a large uptake in the 
amount of web-based job opportunities.
2
  These virtual work environments, while rapidly 
expanding in use, are absent worker protections that are otherwise enjoyed by workers of the 
traditional work environments.
3
 Most succinctly, “[t]hese are new forms of labor but old forms 
of exploitation.”4 
                                                          

 J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Muhlenberg College.  I would like to thank 
Professor Frank A. Pasquale for his guidance.  I am also thankful to the Haight family who graciously lent me their 
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1
 For a timeline of notable labor developments, visit AFL-CIO, Labor History Timeline (last visited Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.aflcio.org/About/Our-History/Labor-History-Timeline.  
2
 TREBOR SCHOLZ, DIGITAL LABOR: THE INTERNET AS PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY, 1 (2012) (“Over the past six 
years, web-based work environments have emerged that are devoid of the worker protections of even the most 
precarious working-class jobs.”). 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id.   
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While virtual work comes in different forms,
5
 this Comment will focus on one particular 
form of virtual work called “crowdsourcing.”  Crowdsourcing, or click-working (“clicking”),6 is 
a way to utilize the masses of online users to perform simple tasks for a small fee.
7
  A 
complicated task is broken down into many pieces and distributed to thousands of workers 
throughout cyberspace, which are then consolidated into a finished product.
8
  Computers are 
used to automate the work distribution to clickers and to configure completed tasks.
9
  In the past, 
crowdsourcing has been used in various large-scale projects, such as locating Steve Fosset
10
 or 
counting craters that appear in images of Mars.
11
  Essentially, “[c]rowdsourcing takes the 
products of many workers to create something greater than the sum of its parts.”12  As 
crowdsourcing continues to gain popularity, Congress and the courts will need to grapple with 
employment laws as they apply to virtual work forums.   
The overarching issue is one of fairness: crowdsourcing allows employers to circumvent 
labor and employment laws and potentially exploit a massive work force under the guise of 
entertainment or play.  As a result, the value returned to workers for their input labor is not 
proportional to the benefit generated for the employer.  Generally, the Federal Labor and 
Standards Act (FLSA) is the federal law of broad application governing minimum wage, 
                                                          
5
 One such form is the token economics that have been created with the advent of virtual reality video games such as 
Second Life or Everquest.  These types of virtual work make it possible to “work in a fantasy world to pay rent in 
reality.”  F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004). 
6
 Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 
60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1088–89 (2009).  Many call those completing crowdsourcing tasks “click-workers,” but for 
clarity and to avoid a naming scheme that incorporates that which is sought to be proven, this Comment will refer to 
those performing crowdsourcing tasks as “clickers.”  
7
 Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006) at 176, 178–79. 
8
 Id.  
9
 See Cherry, supra note 6.  
10
 Dan Fost, Despite Silicon Valley Optimism, a Disease Resists Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, at C6 (describing 
failed searches for Fossett and James Gray, a scientist who was lost at sea). 
11
 Nick Eaton, NASA, Microsoft wants you to help research Mars, THE MICROSOFT BLOG (2009), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2009/11/18/nasa-microsoft-want-you-to-help-research-mars/.   
12
 See Cherry, supra note 6.  
3 
 
overtime pay, youth employment, and record keeping. 
13
  This law was meant to ensure a basic 
level of fairness, inter alia, in the relationship between the worker’s input effort, the firm’s 
benefit from the worker’s input, and the worker’s ultimate value in the form of compensation.14  
In virtual work forums, this relationship is unevenly distributed to favor the firms that are 
utilizing crowdsourcing.  The FLSA has not been applied to offer rectification.   
Consequently, the FLSA does not contain a definition of “work.”15  In addition to a 
cloudy definitional starting point, this unfairness is exacerbated by gamification: “applying 
game-design thinking to non-game applications to make them more fun and engaging.”16  
Gamification continues to blur the FLSA’s overly-vague distinction between work and play.  
Additionally, firms using crowdsourcing are not subject to any regulation that may require 
fairness in wages—an instance of regulatory arbitrage.17   Without regulations in virtual work 
forums, firms may choose crowdsourcing instead of hiring additional workers in order to 
circumvent laws like the FLSA.  The advent of unregulated virtual work calls into question the 
modern relevance and effectiveness of the FLSA in ensuring worker fairness through a more 
appropriate work/play classification.   
                                                          
13
 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
14
 “The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard 
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels 
and  instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of 
the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method 
of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of 
goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 202 
(2006) 
15
 Id.  
16
 Adam Swann, Gamification Comes of Age, FORBESBRANDVOICE (July 16, 2912), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gyro/2012/07/16/gamification-comes-of-age/.  
17
 See infra Part VI.  
4 
 
The implications of the gap in the FLSA’s protection are best found through example.  
Consider a clicker contributing to a question-answer crowdsourcing scheme.
 18
  Suppose a high 
school student makes $15 per hour two days per week babysitting an infant for five hours until 
the child’s mother or father returns home from work.  At the end of most weeks, she had earned 
approximately $150 to spend recreationally.  The babysitter lives comfortably with her parents 
who cover her other expenses.  While the infant takes a nap, the babysitter completes human-
augmented search tasks to fill the time and compensation is delivered to her account.  According 
to the babysitter, it is “kind of fun and fills the time.”  Should this be considered work or play?  
Does the answer change if the babysitter—now full-time and no longer financially supported by 
anyone— earned $1,000 from crowdsourcing throughout the year with the intent to enhance her 
income?  That extra money would now be spent on purchasing necessities such as food, rent, and 
clothes.  Is this work or play? To what extent do should courts consider other sources of income, 
the clicker’s intent, the clicker’s age, and other factors to reach an answer to the work-leisure 
question that is fair to the clicker? 
Another problematic work-play distinction resulting from virtual work is the Chinese 
gold farmer, a case in which the distinction between work and play has become a line blurred 
beyond recognition.
19
  In numerous set-ups across China, rooms are filled with computers 
running online massive multiplayer games such as World of Warcraft.  The workers put in nearly 
84 hours of play per week earning gold coins that will be sold to American and European 
                                                          
18
 This scheme is also referred to as “human augmented search.”  Some brand-name manifestations of these services 
are Cha-Cha or KGB, popular services that provide answers via text message to questions using crowdsourcing to 
find the answer.  See Katharine Mieszkowski, “I make $1.45 a week and I love it”, SALON (July 24, 2006), available 
at http://www.salon.com/2006/07/24/turks_3/.; Post by Erik Hans Rasmussen, Essential Tools for Crowdsourcing 
Answers to Your Questions, INSTANTSHIFT (May 8, 2012), http://www.instantshift.com/2012/05/08/essential-tools-
for-crowdsourcing-answers-to-your-questions/. 
19
 See Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 969–72 (2011). 
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gamers.
20
  The gold farmer will earn approximately thirty cents per hour for their efforts.  The 
New York Times reports, “[c]ollectively they employ an estimated 100,000 workers, who 
produce the bulk of all the goods in what has become a $1.8 billion worldwide trade in virtual 
items.”21  How can the law manage these kinds of working/gaming relationships to assure fair 
compensation?   
The current legal approach is insufficient for several reasons, the most obvious being that 
there has been no legal intervention to date in crowdsourcing.  As such, the courts have yet to be 
tested in that regard.  More importantly, the existing legal framework for determining whether 
something is work or leisure is vague and difficult to apply.  The Supreme Court defined work as 
“physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.”22  The Court later 
extended the definition to off-duty work if it is an “integral and indispensable part of the 
[employee’s] activities.”23  In fact, courts are only now dealing with the advent of smart phones 
extending the work day as well as the emergence of remote log-in capabilities with respect to the 
work-leisure divide.
24
  As courts struggle to apply a murky framework to these emerging issues, 
its application would be even more difficult for crowdsourcing where an income-earning task 
can be “gamified.”25  Accordingly, courts should seek to understand the contours of particular 
                                                          
20
 Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Goldfarmer, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&. 
21
 Id.  
22
 Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). 
23
 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956).    
24
 Spencer Silverglate and Craig Salner, Smartphones and the Fair Labor and Standards Act, FOR THE DEFENSE 
(June 2011), http://cspalaw.com/pdf/Smartphones.pdf.  
25
 See JANE MCGONIGAL, REALITY IS BROKEN: WHY GAMES MAKE US BETTER AND HOW THEY CAN CHANGE THE 
WORLD (2011).  But see David Golumbia, Soc’y of Literature, Sci. & the Arts Conference Paper, Game of Drones 
(September 2012), http://www.uncomputing.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/game-of-drones.blog-version.pdf 
("Perhaps the most disturbing entry into the discourse of gamification so far is Jane McGonigal’s Reality Is Broken, 
a book that closely replicates the form of intellectual inquiry while persistently avoiding most of the important 
intellectual and political questions raised by the book’s subject, a book that masquerades as neutral intellectual study 
while avoiding any substantive reflection on its author’s direct commercial interest in its conclusions.").  
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crowdsourcing work arrangements as they present themselves and attempt to discern their nature.  
With fairness to the clicker as the ultimate concern, courts should consider the perspective of a 
clicker while re-envisioning the work benefit provided to the employer.  By considering these 
factors, courts can better understand the work-leisure divide in terms of fairness for 
crowdsourcing as well as other virtual work forums.     
 This comment will proceed to present a history of labor struggles to recast the light under 
which this subject is viewed away from the novelty of the internet.  A connection will be made 
between the narrative of the traditionally exploited factory worker and the modern phenomenon 
of clickers.  Next, Part III will summarize other relevant issues in applying the FLSA to 
crowdsourcing.  Part IV will explore the definition “work” and how the work/play distinction has 
been approached in the past.  Some instances of crowdsourcing will constitute work while others 
may not.  The penultimate section will promulgate factors by which to analyze crowdsourcing 
and demonstrate potential application.  Finally, Part VI will conclude the Comment, 
summarizing presented issues, noting solutions, and other areas that warrant further 
consideration. 
 
II. CROWDSOURCING AS PART OF A LARGER NARRATIVE ON LABOR 
 
A. The Struggle for Labor Rights 
 
History informs the present in that employers, if left unchecked, will seek new ways to 
extract value from employees.  Without regulation, the internet is an unchecked source of 
valuable labor.  While online workers need not worry about work conditions, their time and 
energies are vulnerable as were factory workers at the turn of the century.  And importantly, they 
face the same issue: fairness in the employer benefit to employee compensation ratio.  In the 
7 
 
beginning of the twentieth century, a new America was emerging.  As slavery had been 
abolished and reconstructive mechanisms were underway, factories and the manufacturing 
industry exploded in what would be known as America’s Industrial Revolution.26  With the trend 
towards an industrial America, unions began to form in response to the industrialization, 
including the famous Women’s Trade Union League and the Industrial Workers of the World.27  
But while the formation of these unions signified a changing attitude toward workers, the 
conditions of America’s work places were still in shambles even into the 1930’s.28  Factory 
managers were trying to meet the high demands of their buyers at the expense of their work 
force, and consequently, the workers were forced to endure if they wanted to feed their families.  
  One illustrative example of the horrendous working conditions of the time is the 
Triangle Shirtwaist Fire.
29
  The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire occurred in a sweatshop typical of the 
time: employers worked excessively long hours for low wages and factories were unsanitary and 
contained dangerous working conditions.
30
  On March 25, 1911, a fire erupted at the building 
that housed the garment company.
31
  As workers attempted to flee, they found the doors and 
windows locked.
32
  The management had locked these doors during the day in order to lessen the 
frequency of breaks and decrease the chance of a worker stealing materials.
33
  The fire claimed 
the lives of 146 employees by the time it was contained.
34
  This event highlights a traditional 
employer trying to acquire more value from their workforce at all costs.  While virtual work 
                                                          
26
 Labor History Timeline, supra note 1. 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id.; see also REMEMBERING THE 1911 TRIANGLE FACTORY FIRE, Cornel Univ., 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/story/sweatshopsStrikes.html. 
29
 CORINNE J. NADEN, THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE, MARCH 25, 1911: THE BLAZE THAT CHANGED AN INDUSTRY 
(1971).   
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
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forums present a safer physical work environment than a plant or factory, the risk of worker 
exploitation is still high.         
The 1920 and 1930s saw an increase in strikes—including some where, as a result, 
employers actually granted workers their demands.
35
  Other strikes were less successful, like, for 
example, as in the 1934 textile industry strike.
36
  As the injustices of the managers became a 
major issue, Congress acted in 1938 by passing the Fair Labor and Standard Act (FLSA) to 
“stabilize the economy and protect the common labor force in response to the post-depression 
predominance of poverty and fear of an ever-increasing decline in the economy.”37  While the 
intent of the FLSA was clear, its language was often ambiguous and left much work for the 
courts in its application.  Nevertheless, the FLSA was a major victory in the laborer’s struggle 
for protections against management.  Despite these advances in labor and employment law, 
recent studies have shown that many factories today still do not comply with workplace laws.
38
  
In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor found that 67% of Los Angeles garment factories and 63% 
of New York garment factories violate minimum wage and overtime laws.
39
  Additionally, 98% 
of Los Angeles garment factories have had workplace health and safety problems serious enough 
to lead to severe injuries or death. 
40
   
From picketing and strikes to unionizing against management, workers of the early 
twentieth century took risks to secure the protections workers enjoy today.  Management has 
demonstrated that they will attempt to make a higher profit at the expense of their workforce.  As 
                                                          
35
 See Labor History Timeline, supra note 1. 
36
 Id.     
37
 Ann K. Wooster, Validity, Construction, and Application of Fair Labor Standards Act—Supreme Court Cases, 
196 A.L.R. Fed. 507 (2004).   
38
 See Labor History Timeline, supra note 1.  
39
 See id.  
40
 See id.  
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employers cross into the non-traditional virtual world for new sources of labor, the risks of 
physical injury are less, but worker fairness is still compromised.    
 
B. Crowdsourcing: How it Works and Problematic Implications 
 
As discussed supra, crowdsourcing provides an employer with an instant mass of 
laborers.
41
  In general, there has been a steady decrease in traditional labor in the United States, 
but virtual workers offer new avenues for labor.
42
   These new laborers are paid to complete tasks 
that require little to no skillset.  While crowdsourcing comes in several varieties, this Comment 
focuses one particular brand of crowdsourcing for purposes of example—compensation 
arrangements in the form of piece-rate payment or wages akin to the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
model.
43
  In general, crowdsourcing consists of three parties; a “tripartite structure” as one author 
terms it.
44
  The first is the firm, or the employer that posts a task on a crowdsourcing website.
45
  
The second is the clicker, the person at a computer who completes a task.
46
  The third party is the 
vendor in charge of the crowdsourcing platform, the virtual space where tasks are posted.
47
  As a 
condition of platform use, workers and firms enter into a participation agreement that is usually 
crafted by the vendor.
48
   
                                                          
41
 See infra Part I.  
42
 Florence Jaumotte, Is Labor Compensation Still Falling in Advanced Economies?, IMF SURVEY MAGAZINE (May 
24, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/num052412a.htm.  
43
 See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK (last visited April 20, 2013), https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome.  
44
 Alek Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor Law in the Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2011). 
45
 Id. at 148. 
46
 Id. at 148.  
47
 Id. at 148.  See, e.g., AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK supra note 43; TASKRABBIT (last visited on October 11, 2012), 
https://www.taskrabbit.com/?utm_source=blog.  
48
 See, e.g., AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, Conditions of Use, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse.  
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Notably, one familiar website has created a platform for this technology called Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT).
49
  Using this platform, thousands of workers log on to complete what 
Amazon terms “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs).50  These HITs typically consist of tagging 
photos, writing on Wikipedia or Answers.com, comparing product descriptions, or gauging the 
suitability of various images for varying audiences.
51
  Other tasks include transcription
52
 or 
augmented searching.
53
  While click-work is largely performed by Americans in their downtime, 
the trend is certainly expanding.  In fact, “thousands of workers from the U.S. and [sic] more 
than 100 other countries have performed tasks on Mturk.com.”54  To date, neither Congress nor 
the courts have imposed specific laws on these virtual work forums.
55
   
In a typical crowdsourcing scheme, the requester posts a task on the crowdsourcing 
platform.  A clicker logs onto the site, finds the task and completes it.
56
  Tasks are usually simple 
in nature, requiring no special skillset.
57
  Notably, there are crowdsourcing platforms that provide 
more complicated tasks for those qualifying clickers.
58
  These more advanced tasks, or “macro 
tasks,” pay slightly more than other “micro tasks,” which do not require skills.59  Once the task is 
                                                          
49
 See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK supra note 43. 
50
 Id.; see also Amazon Web Services Launches New Web-Based Tools For Mechanical Turk, DATAMONITOR (July 
30, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 14200460.    
51
 Andrea James, Service Offers Pay For Doing Tiny Tasks Online, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, July 31, 2008, at 
D2, http://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Amazon-service-offers-pay-for-doing-tiny-tasks-1280767.php.   
52
 Companies will post audio files for Turkers to type out.  That transcription will then be reposted to AMT for 
another Turker to check its accuracy.  Another HIT will ask a user to make edits, and another HIT will ask the 
Turker to check for quality.  See Mieszkowski, supra note 18.  
53
 Over the past few years, several answer services have emerged.  See, e.g., KGB, http://kgb.com/home.  Once your 
text is received, it is placed on a crowdsourcing site for Turkers to find an answer.  The answer is found, messaged 
back, and the recipient may text an answer rating back to the service.  The Turker receives a few cents for helping.  
If a Turker acquires good ratings, they may receive a bonus at the end of the week in reward for their efforts.  This 
competitive aspect makes these tasks especially desirable and they are often taken with a minute of being posted.  
See Mieszkowski, supra note 18.  
54
 See Mieszkowski, supra note 19.  During the writing of this Comment, AMT banned international accounts.  
55
 See Felstiner, supra note 44.  
56
 Id. at 161.  
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id.  
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completed, payment is made from the requester to the clicker.
60
  A percentage of that payment is 
usually reserved for the platform firm.
61
    
As for physical logistics, the clicker need not commute anywhere in particular—only 
access to the internet is needed.
62
  The clicker provides his own physical space, internet access, 
computer, and electricity.
63
  This may seem trivial as most people already have these amenities 
for personal use, but it can be an important difference between virtual work and traditional work 
venues where an employer would provide such things in an office building.   
For now, this virtual realm is left open to the freedom of contracting.  Where vendors 
write user agreements that dispel liability and quash the suggestion of an employer-employee 
relationship, workers are seemingly left to fend for themselves.
64
  For the more conscious users, 
clickers formed separate web forums to discuss the fairness of certain firms and platforms.
65
  
This can be useful in circumstances where an employer continually refuses to pay a clicker for a 
completed task by way of a refusal power often granted by the language of the user 
agreements.
66
  In these forums, clickers would discuss this amongst themselves and make it 
known to other clickers that completing tasks for that particular employer is not worth it.  Of 
course, this is hardly a substitute for the application of labor and employment laws.
67
   
The clickers themselves are likely subject to a phenomenon referred to as gamification.  
Gamification is a process by which businesses are beginning to make tasks enjoyable to those 
                                                          
60
 Id.  
61
 See Conditions of Use, supra note 48 .  
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 AMT’s agreement includes exculpation of liability clauses. See Conditions of Use, supra note 61.  
65
 Turk Nation is one such forum which corresponds to AMT experiences.  See TURK NATION, 
http://turkernation.com/forum.php?s=b7b9c24dbc0940c879cdd8f969f4dde8.  
66
 See Conditions of Use, supra note 48.  
67
 See Cherry, supra note 6.  
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completing them.
68
  Due to gamification, the current approach is not well-suited to an activity 
that many regard as play but certainly benefits an employer.  In crowdsourcing, the work 
relationship is not likely apparent to most clickers.  Crowdsourcing is still in its developmental 
stages and as such, courts may struggle to understand the specific nature of crowdsourcing.  For 
example, the benefit that employers enjoy from the combined efforts of clickers reaches far 
wider than would an employee answering a quick email after hours.  Without meaningful legal 
protections, clickers are vulnerable.   
In crowdsourcing, there is an army of workers for whom an employer need not provide 
an office building, electricity, healthcare, a retirement fund contribution, or even the more basic 
protection of minimum wage.  Accordingly, this is an issue that courts or the legislature must 
face in order to ensure that workers in virtual work forums are given the same or similar 
protections.  Whether a worker goes to an office building or logs onto a home computer to 
complete a Human Intelligence Task on Amazon Mechanical Turk, they are still workers just the 
same.      
III. THE FLSA AND OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES 
 
Before seeking to classify crowdsourcing as work or leisure, it is important to briefly 
encapsulate some of the predicate or tangential issues that may arise in a fuller application of the 
FLSA.  Again, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the federal law of broad application 
governing minimum wage, overtime pay, youth employment, and record keeping.
69
  In order to 
avail oneself of these protections, a worker must be considered an employee and not an 
independent contractor.
70
  The Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor 
                                                          
68
 Post by P.J. Rey, Gamification, Playbor and Exploitation, THE SOCIETY PAGES (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/10/15/gamification-playbor-exploitation-2/.  
69
 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
70
 Id. 
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enforces the FLSA.
71
  Specifically, the FLSA provides for a forty hour workweek that an 
employer is responsible for paying an employee.
72
  Anything over that time is paid at one and 
one half times the amount paid for an hour of work.
73
  Additionally, the FLSA provides for a 
minimum wage, that is, a floor for the amount of money a worker must be paid.
74
   
The first pivotal issue is whether clickers are employees or independent contractors.
75
  On 
a basic level, if a worker is deemed an independent contractor, the protections of the FLSA do 
not attach and there is little protection to the worker under these laws.
76
  The worker would 
instead be bound by contractual arrangements which do not necessarily provide legal 
protection.
77
  Courts have framed this analysis to examine the nature of the work relationships 
and the Department of Labor encapsulated the factors accordingly:  
1. the extent to which the services rendered are an integral part of the 
principal's business;  
2. the permanency of the relationship;  
3. the amount of the alleged contractor's investment in facilities and 
equipment;  
4. the nature and degree of control by the principal;  
5. the alleged contractor's opportunities for profit and loss;  
6. the amount of initiative, judgment, or foresight in open market 
competition with others required for the success of the claimed 
independent contractor;  
7. the degree of independent business organization and operation.78   
 
                                                          
71
 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Fair Labor and Standards Act Presentation, accessed September 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id.  
74
 Id. While the FLSA sets the minimum wage and overtime pay standards, it does not require: (1) vacation, holiday, 
severance or sick pay; (2) meal or rest periods; (3) premium pay for weekend or holiday work; (4) pay raises or 
fringe benefits; (5) a discharge notice, reason for discharge, or immediate payment of final wages to terminated 
employees; or (6) limitations on the number of hours in a day or days in a week an employee may be required to 
work, including overtime hours (if the employee is at least 16 years old).  29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).  
75
 See Felstiner, supra note 44, at 172.  
76
 Id.  
77
 Id. 
78
 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR STANDARDS DIV., FACT SHEET #13: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), 1 (last updated July 2009), 
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf. 
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Some speculate that these workers will fall into a “grey area” between the independent contractor 
and employee.
79
  To date, this question as it pertains to clickers manifests itself in academic 
literature outside of the scope of the legislature or court system.  The importance of this issue 
should not be underestimated as it is a first hurdle in navigating the application of the FLSA to 
cyber work.  The courts or legislature will need to address this issue and dispel any doubts as to 
the general status of these workers.
80
  Even if the solution is an entirely new legal scheme under 
which these workers are classified, the question of employee status is a predicate to the issue 
discussed in this Comment—the work-leisure distinction with respect to crowdsourcing.  
Another issue that would certainly impact other analyses is the FLSA requirement of 
minimum wage.
81
  Due to the nature of crowdsourcing, it is very difficult to earn a minimum 
wage while being paid pennies for the completion of a task.
82
  Further, the small payment would 
only be from one employer out of the many for which a clicker completed tasks during an hour.  
For example, suppose a clicker manages to earn minimum wage in an hour by completing fifteen 
tasks.  As is the nature of crowdsourcing, suppose also that those fifteen tasks were completed 
for fifteen different employers using the platform site.  Under the FLSA, the multiple employers 
may be forced to make up the difference between their payment and the minimum wage.
83
  
Another issue is the status of the hosting platform.
84
  While platforms are not posting work, they 
do in fact take a percentage of the payments; in this respect, the question of a joint-employer 
relationship arises.
85
   
                                                          
79
 Joan T. A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and its Impact on the Employment 
Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 303 (2003). 
80
 See Felstiner, supra note 44, at 187-97. 
81
 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).  
82
 See Felstiner, supra note 44, at 162. 
83
 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006); see also Felstiner, supra note 44, at 162.   
84
 See Felstiner, supra note 44, at 162. 
85
 See id. 
15 
 
These are some ancillary issues with regard to applying the FLSA to crowdsourcing.  
While these issues will bear heavily on courts and the legislature in the future, they work hand in 
hand with a classification of the type of work or play being performed that is the subject of this 
Comment.  If crowdsourcing is simply deemed a leisure activity, the preceding issues are moot.  
Likewise, if the courts find clickers to be independent contractors, the question of whether 
actions are work or leisure is never reached.  Clearly, the courts and legislature will have much 
to do in parsing out the problematic issue of crowdsourcing with respect to labor and 
employment laws.       
IV. DEFINING “WORK”  
 
A point of confusion in applying the law, the FLSA does not include a particularly useful 
definition of work.
86
  The words “work” or “employment” within maximum hour provisions of 
the FLSA mean “physical or mental exertion, whether burdensome or not, controlled or required 
by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his 
business.”87  Instead, interpretation was left open for the courts.  This void enables employers to 
stretch the benefit they receive from their employees, particularly with respect to wait-time or 
other grey areas.
88
   
Under the FLSA, an individual is either working or he is not.
89
  As one scholar aptly 
phrased the definitional quandary, “[w]hile the FLSA thus establishes certain guidelines for 
compensating employees for their work, it neither defines the term ‘work’ nor indicates when 
on-call time might be considered ‘work.’”90  Accordingly, a worker’s time is necessarily forced 
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into either the “work” box or the “leisure” box.  In one sense, it is a binary categorization that 
bodes well on legal clarity, creating a legal distinction between work and leisure time.
91
  At the 
same time, practical application in closer calls has long been a source of confusion for courts.
92
  
For instance, it is easy to distinguish between answering work emails at the workplace and 
playing in the company softball league, but what about a worker responding to a series of work 
emails on a Blackberry, or smartphone, before going to bed?
93
  Crowdsourcing presents one of 
those situations akin to the blurry line of Blackberries, that is, not everything is so easily labeled 
as work or leisure.
94
  Herein lies one of issues for crowdsourcing.  In one respect, clickers are 
comprised of individuals who are trying to fill their down time with tasks while another group of 
clickers may use crowdsourcing as a viable means of income.     
Furthermore, “the Portal-to-Portal Act that amended the FLSA also omits any definition 
of the word ‘work.’”95  The Department of Labor (DOL) does not provide any additional 
guidance by defining compensable time as time during which an employee is “on duty on the 
employer's premises or at a prescribed workplace, as well as all other time during which the 
employee is suffered or permitted to work for the employer.”96  This lack of administrative and 
regulatory guidance adds to the perplexity of understanding this work/leisure gap, a gap into 
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which crowdsourcing likely falls.
97
  Accordingly, the current definition of work has largely been 
driven by court decisions.
98
  
Clicking is a very novel concept as is much of the work that takes place in virtual 
worlds.
99
  Perhaps due this novelty, many clickers do not conceive of clicking as “work.”100  
Many Americans who use AMT “state that their interest in Mechanical Turk is solely motivated 
by the novelty of the experience. This fact could be explained by the seemingly negligible 
amount of income that can be earned through AMT for a U.S.-based worker.”101  Instead, it is 
regarded as a play or leisure time.
102
  Conversely, that is not the case for all, especially the 33% 
of Amazon Mechanical Turk’s workforce that are located in India relying on AMT to “make 
basic ends meet.”103  This group of workers in India and even those in China “appear to be 
mostly interested in Mechanical Turk as a primary income source, though some of them find that 
AMT undervalues their labor.”104  Studies bolster the position that many view this type of virtual 
work as leisure.
105
  In some respect, companies that are using crowdsourcing enjoy the benefit of 
this leisure disguise.
106
  If many who are giving companies real work value through clicking feel 
that they are in fact on their own leisure time, it gives the employer a veil of clicker enjoyment 
under which they can continue to capitalize on a work force that does not realize the very fact 
that they are a work force.   
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Without classifying crowdsourcing as work, there is a real fear that companies will be 
able to exploit a virtual crowd and secure nearly free labor.
107
  One parallel example of a blurred 
work-leisure distinction is an online game for children called Club Penguin discussed by 
Professor Miriam Cherry.  Cherry writes that Club Penguin could be conceived as work in that 
 [t]hey are on the computer—which is, after all, a machine—repetitively clicking 
the mouse, typing, and performing tasks that comprise some element of “work” in 
the professional white-collar world—for long  stretches of time.  And the tasks 
that they perform do have value to other players in the game.
108
 
   
Conversely, the online tasks performed by users are done purely out of intentions of leisure.
109
  
As will be discussed below in the area of unpaid internships, this is what makes crowdsourcing a 
very difficult area to regulate—the great employer benefit from an activity regarded as leisure.   
To complicate matters further, the thoughts and intentions of clickers are influenced by 
gamification.  Gamification is a highly studied concept today with an entire field of study 
devoted to its understanding.
110
  One entrepreneur defines gamification as “the application in 
non-game domains (health & wellness, education, finance, etc.) of mechanics and dynamics 
evolved from games.  It’s…cool (when successful) because it creates a completely different and 
highly motivating context for a user’s experience.  Rather than feeling like they have “to jump 
through hoops,” the user discovers compelling challenges, and reaps psychological rewards 
when those challenges are completed.  The net result is the holy grail of interactive product 
design: sustained engagement.”111  One well-known example of gamification is Fruit Ninja, the 
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popular smart phone game.
112
  Just from the advertising revenue, Fruit Ninja makes about 
$400,000 per month.
113
  In this simple way, a person who is seemingly playing a game, enjoying 
themselves, is actually creating monetary revenue for a firm on the other side of the “game.”   
In one regard, gamification presents an opportunity for innovation, but for some it is a 
chance for worker exploitation, a position adopted here.  Not surprisingly, businesses are at the 
forefront of the gamification strategy: “In short, gamification is promoted and championed—not 
by game designers, those interested in game studies, sociologists of labor/play, or even 
computer-human interaction researchers—but by business folks.”114  With “business folks” 
leading the gamification trend, “[g]amification cannot be understood apart from the mode of 
capitalist production and all the power relations and inequalities that implies.  Like tools, 
tactics/techniques are never neutral.”115  It is in this perception, away from the trendiness of 
gaming and enjoyment, that gamification can be understood as the exploitative mechanism of 
companies, turning labor into “playbor.”116  One sociologist, P.J. Rey, writes, “[l]ike the 
paradigmatic factory workers, playborers only come to possess a small fraction of the value they 
create.  Often, playborers obtain none of the monetary value they have created.  And, of course, 
this is exactly how the playbor’s capitalist promoters want it.”117  Some AMT clickers responded 
to this criticism by saying that they enjoy the novel trendiness of the site, pointing to the nominal 
income made from the tasks as evidence.
118
  Regardless of a clicker’s enjoyment, that rationale 
does not negate the fact of exploitation and ought not to be used to completely subjugate an 
emerging issue.   
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The implications of gamification for crowdsourcing are troublesome.  With access to an 
immense and growing mass of clickers, companies are prone to capitalize on the notion of 
“playbor.”  As one professor writes, “[f]irms may try to use game-like experiences as a substitute 
for meaningful work or appropriate compensation.  The legal and ethical questions deserve 
thoughtful consideration, and perhaps public policy responses.”119  Gamification of work 
presents the courts with a difficult situation: navigating a novel online work-scape that is being 
manipulated to seem like play time.   
With gamification and a virtual world without regulation, “there is a strong incentive to 
innovate around prohibited or disadvantaged transactions.  These innovations are commonly 
referred to as regulatory arbitrage.”120  Regulatory arbitrage is defined as “the shifting of activity 
to the least stringent regulatory regime…” and“…occurs when an entity reclassifies, relocates, or 
slightly alters its activity in order to avoid legal scrutiny traditionally associated with that 
activity.”121  For example, “[i]n the finance field, attorneys characterized credit default swaps as 
‘protection buying’ and ‘protection selling’ rather than insurance or gambling, thus evading 
capital requirements (in the case of insurance law) or the outright bans that might apply to 
gambling.”123  Further, “[w]hile the transactions were essentially identical to traditional 
insurance—where the buyer had an insurable interest in the entity whose default it was 
protecting against—or gambling—where there was no such insurable interest and a ‘naked credit 
default swap’ was arranged—their legal characterizations allowed large financial institutions to 
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sidestep traditional regulatory limits on risky transactions.”124  Similarly in the crowdsourcing 
context, employers can take advantage of a loosely regulated virtual world where work is 
considered play and benefit tremendously by avoiding substantial cost that would otherwise be 
associated with the completion of their projects.   
Such circumvention may not always be deliberate either.  In the fusion center context, for 
example, “there may be no clear way for a Florida fusion center to know that it should not be 
receiving information provided by the Mississippi fusion center.”125  The circumvention may be 
intentional, but it may certainly be the case that employers are innocently seeking innovation.  
Here, one non-intentional explanation could be the familiar case of technology out-pacing the 
law.   When the internet was first formed, it was hailed as a dreamscape away from government 
intervention, a new sovereign.
126
  While that notion has been abandoned, the government has yet 
to meaningfully rebut it in regulatory action.  Employers may be making the next logical, 
innovative step to capitalize on the internet’s work force before the law can evolve to promote 
fairness for the clickers.   
This section will proceed to understand how courts thus far have grappled with defining 
“work.”  It will begin with the broad issue of compensable time—the time for which an 
employee must be paid.  Sections dealing with on-call time and unpaid internships will follow.  
Ultimately, the court embraces specific factors by which to judge nebulous instances of the 
work-leisure distinction.  The factors themselves would not reach crowdsourcing directly as they 
are applied on a case-by-case basis depending on the area at issue: compensable time, on-call 
time, or internships.  Instead, these factors—especially those used for analyzing unpaid 
                                                          
124
 Id.   
125
 Id. 
126
 Renato Mariotti, Cyberspace in Three Dimensions, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 251, 280 (2005). 
22 
 
internships— may inform what factors ought to be included in approaching the issue of work or 
leisure in virtual work forums.   
A. Compensable Time Cases 
 
Over the years, the Court has expanded and contracted the definition of compensable 
time.  The Supreme Court first began to explore this void in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad. 
Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123.
127
  The Court inquired as to whether time spent by iron ore 
miners in traveling underground in mines to and from the workplace constituted work or 
employment for which compensation must be paid.
128
   The Court opined that “[i]ron ore miners 
travelling underground are no less engaged in a ‘process or occupation’ necessary to actual 
production.”129  The Court went on to say that “[h]ence employees engaged in such necessary but 
not directly productive activities as watching and guarding a building, waiting for work, and 
standing by on call
 
have been held to be engaged in work necessary to production and entitled to 
the benefits of the Act.”130 
Subsequent cases continued to broaden the definition of a work day.  For example, the 
Court expanded on Tennessee Coal in Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co.  In that case, the 
Court stated that “[i]t follows that the time spent in walking to work on the employer's premises, 
after the time clocks were punched, involved ‘physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome 
or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit of the employer and his business.’”131  Congress then passed a regulation which stated 
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that hours within a “workday” include “the period between the commencement and completion” 
of the “principal activity or activities.”132 
Later, Congress passed the Portal to Portal Act, which excepted from FLSA coverage 
walking on the employer's premises to and from the location of the employee's “principal activity 
or activities,” and activities that are “preliminary or postliminary” to “said principal activity or 
activities.”133  The Act did not otherwise change this Court's descriptions of “work” and 
“workweek” or define “workday.”  The Act was intended in part to curb the liability of 
employers after the worker-generous rulings in Tennessee and Anderson.  Congress acted again 
by adding another section to the FLSA which limited the employers’ obligation to pay 
employees for time spent changing clothes, an issue that was becoming thematic in litigation.
134
 
The Court later explained that the “term ‘principal activity or activities’ . . .  embraces all 
activities which are ‘an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities,’” including the 
donning and doffing of specialized protective gear “before or after the regular work shift, on or 
off the production line.”135   
For crowdsourcing, there is no time spent donning a specific uniform, waiting in line, or 
even walking up the steps to an office building, but perhaps there is something that does warrant 
compensation given the difference between a manufacturing or office setting and a digital work 
forum.  Consider one version of a clicker that wakes up in the morning, remains in pajamas, 
boots up his home desktop, and begins crowdsourcing tasks.  Superficially, one is tempted to say 
that clickers get paid for the tasks they complete, but what about the time spent booting up the 
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computer?  Is this compensable time?  This is arguably an analog to booting up the computer in 
the office building, which the court has held to be part of the workers’ compensable time.  Using 
the Court’s “principle activity or activities” language, it is clear that the principal activity is the 
clicking itself.  The “integral and indispensable part of the principal activities” could very well 
constitute turning on the computer in this context.  All too obvious a statement, clicking could 
not take place without booting up the computer.  Accordingly, it would make sense to reflect the 
employer’s savings on workspace and technology in the clickers’ earnings.     
Conversely, the virtual nature of this work may be seen as a blessing in disguise to the 
work force that no longer needs to worry about a commute, unsatisfactory workspace conditions, 
or time spent preparing for the workday so long as he compensation is fair.  It is true that virtual 
work gives the worker better control and access to work by using his self-provided work spaces 
and computers.  In line with this theory, the problem of these start-up activities may fall into the 
category of de minimus activities that do not warrant compensation, as they are too insignificant 
to support a claim under the FLSA.
136
  The Court noted that some periods of compensable time 
may be so small “as to be negligible” and when time consists of “only a few seconds or minutes 
of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded.”137  The de 
minimus doctrine works in favor of the employer to curb suits regarding miniscule amounts of 
time, especially since the FLSA and courts left the definition of work open for interpretation.
138
  
For the clicker, preparing a computer probably takes a few minutes at most between turning on 
the power, getting to the crowdsourcing platform, and beginning a task.  While virtual work is 
largely the same as traditional work, this may constitute one of the meaningful differences 
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between the work forums, that is, compensable time is complicated by self-provision of 
workspace and conditions.  Crowdsourcing further complicates this in that payment is per task 
and not for a cognizable work day.  It remains to be seen whether this will be an issue or simply 
falls under the de minimus doctrine.   
B. On-Call Time  
 
Another informative source of litigation is the court’s handling of “on-call” time.  One 
example of this is when an employee may leave the work premises to go home, but is on call to 
return at a moment’s notice to work.  Put another way, “[a]t the same time, their employers 
obtain a substantial benefit by being able to keep their workforces lean, knowing that if extra 
work arises, they may simply call on an off-duty, on-call employee.”139   If a leisure activity, the 
employer receives a windfall from having the benefit of a worker on-call without having to 
tender any compensation for having the benefits received.  In such a case, the law would fail to 
equitably account for the burdens imposed on the worker and the concomitant benefits that flow 
to the employer.
140
  Conversely, considering an employee's on-call time as work, and thus 
compensable at his regular rate of pay, may provide the employee with a windfall, since he will 
be compensated at the same rate as if he were actively working.
141
  For the clicker, it is clear that 
they are not “on-call.”  In fact, with regard to clicking, at least for now, it is up to the clicker 
when he works.  As such, they are never really on-call while not conducting click-work, only 
that they are online performing a task.
142
  Nevertheless, the analysis that the courts undertake is 
helpful as consideration is later given to a potential scheme for classifying crowdsourcing.     
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Specifically, the Court first addressed this issue in the 1940s in Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.
143
  Skidmore involved a group of firemen who were asked to remain at or near the firehouse 
should a fire alarm go off.
144
  The men were allowed to use this time as they saw fit, sleeping or 
for enjoyment, provided that they were required to stay in or close by the fire hall and be ready to 
respond to alarms.
145
  The Court wrote that the inquiry was whether an employee is “engaged to 
wait” or “waiting to be engaged” or, whether the on-call time is spent predominantly for the 
benefit of the employer or the employee.
146
  As the Court indicated, an employee whose on-call 
time is spent predominantly for his own benefit or who is “waiting to be engaged” is not entitled 
to compensation.
147
  “For example, a secretary who reads a book while waiting for dictation or a 
fireman who plays checkers while waiting for an alarm” is “engaged to wait.”148  Ultimately, the 
court concluded that there was not a workable legal standard by which these arrangements ought 
to be viewed, but rather that “[t]he law does not impose an arrangement upon the parties.  It 
imposes upon the courts the task of finding what the arrangement was.  In summary, an 
employee whose on-call time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit and who is thus 
‘engaged to wait’ is entitled to compensation.”149  The Court directed lower courts to consider 
“all the circumstances of the case” in making their determinations.150  The Skidmore Court 
preserved the strict divide drawn by the FLSA between work and leisure time.  Largely, in 
following Skidmore, courts faced with this choice have chosen to side with the employer, 
deeming many on-call time situations that of the employee’s leisure. 
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With little guidance from the Supreme Court after Skidmore, some circuits have adopted 
more encompassing approaches.
151
  The Ninth Circuit, for example, has adopted a list of seven 
factors, which is a compilation of factors used by other circuits and the Supreme Court:  
1. whether the employee was required to remain at the employer's place of 
business;  
2. whether there were excessive geographical restrictions placed on the 
employee;  
3. whether the frequency of calls was restrictive;  
4. whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly restrictive;  
5. whether the on-call employee could easily trade on-call responsibilities;  
6. the method used to communicate a call to the employee; and  
7. whether the employee actually engaged in personal activities while on-call.152  
 
Other circuits, however, have fewer factors, but all progress from Skidmore’s attempt to 
understand the FLSA’s nebulous work-leisure divide.153   
This line of cases continues a trend in the FLSA litigation, that is, the Court’s attempt to 
determine the reality of work relationships.  In this regard, the Court seems to recognize the 
unhelpfulness of a bright-line approach to these issues.
154
  For clicking, the difficulty of 
categorization presents the same kind of blurry divide that prompted courts to use a case-by-case 
approach for on-call time cases.  The same kind of practical thinking must be incorporated into 
an analysis of the work-leisure divide of crowdsourcing.  It would only perpetuate the deficiency 
of the FLSA’s “work” definition if crowdsourcing was categorically classified as either work or 
leisure.   
C. Unpaid Internships 
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Of the issues addressed above, the difficulty of classifying crowdsourcing is most akin to 
unpaid internships.  Here, interns are certainly working and generate a company benefit, but they 
do so on what is considered their own leisure time.
155
  In many cases of unpaid internships, the 
leisure categorization may not be entirely accurate.  Again, while it is easy to write off an unpaid 
internship as experience and a leisure activity, further analysis may reveal worker exploitation on 
the part of employers, a similar phenomenon that is occurring in click-work.
156
   
In increasing numbers, students have been seeking out real-world positions without pay 
in the form of an unpaid internship.
157
  Recently, studies show that there has been a drastic rise in 
the number of students who avail themselves of this arrangement without receiving 
compensation.
158
  It should be noted that internship programs certainly benefit interns.  For 
example, interns are afforded the opportunity to make key networking connections, to understand 
a particular field, and to learn what goes into making a prudent career decision.
159
  In some cases, 
interns may even be offered full time employment with the employer with which they interned.  
Among a host of issues in the realm of competitive unpaid internships,
160
 the case of an 
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employer capitalizing on free labor becomes a critical issue, one that sounds loudly in the 
crowdsourcing context.
161
   
The law in this area has been inconsistent.  Whether one is entitled to minimum wage, 
therefore, depends on whether that person is an “employee” for purposes of the FLSA.162  The 
FLSA, unhelpfully, defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”163  It 
defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work” which leaves much room for interpretation.164  
The first influential case to set forth a cognizable standard was Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Co., a case involving railroad training for new hires.
165
  Specifically, the Court held that:  
[t]he definition ‘suffer or permit to work’ was obviously not intended to 
stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied 
compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the 
premises of another. . . .  Such a construction would sweep under the Act 
each person who, without promise or expectation of compensation, but 
solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on 
by other persons either for their pleasure or profit.
166
   
 
Two approaches have emerged to discern whether a position is a proper unpaid 
internship.  The first is the agency promulgated six factor approach asking if:  
1. the training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the 
employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school;  
2. the training is for the benefit of the trainee;  
3. the trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under [their] close 
observation;  
4. the employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from 
the activities of the trainees and on occasion the employer’s operations may 
actually be impeded;  
5. the trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the 
training period; and  
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6. the employer and the trainee understand that the trainees are not entitled to 
wages for the time spent in training.
167
   
 
An application of the agency test to crowdsourcing is more difficult considering it is specifically 
tailored to internship situations, but its intent may be informative in gathering factors for the 
court to examine in the crowdsourcing context.
168
  In particular, this framework mentions the 
advantage derived by the employer as a result of the work relationship.  Accordingly, the courts 
have attempted to deduce, inter alia, the benefit derived by the employer from the intern.
169
  This 
factor could be a particularly helpful one in the crowdsourcing context.   By looking at the 
benefit to the employer, at least as a factor among others, courts would be in a better position to 
determine the extent to which click-work constitutes “work.”  Crucially, not all clicking may in 
fact be FLSA “work.”  An employer-benefit test would help to reach those that need to be 
covered and separate out a clicker who performs minimal tasks—that minimal worker is not the 
worker in need of FLSA protection.  It also sidesteps the issue of how the clicker views the 
clicking, which often times would be as leisure.  
The Supreme Court chose a different approach, however, establishing the economic 
realities test.
170
  It noted that “[t]he test of employment under the [FLSA] is one of ‘economic 
reality.’”171  To determine whether a worker is an employee under the economic realities test, 
courts “focus on whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent 
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upon the alleged employer or is instead in business for himself.”172  In the context of determining 
whether a trainee or volunteer is an employee, courts examine the “underlying economic facts,” 
especially whether the trainees or interns expect to receive payment for their services.
173   
If 
circumstances indicate that an individual engages in activities expecting compensation, the 
individual is an employee within the meaning of the FLSA.  This test focuses on the 
“circumstances of the whole activity.”174   
These two approaches seek to espouse the different cases of internships: one that offers 
an educational experience and opportunity for the intern as opposed to one that is more of 
acquiring unpaid labor for an employer.  Some programs are intricately crafted to afford 
experience and a taste of what it is like to work in a particular industry, while others seem to take 
advantage of the free work.
175
  With this in mind, it is important to consider the applicability of 
the two tests in examining click-work.  It would seem that the economic realities test is helpful if 
coupled with a conception of the employer’s benefit.  This combination would allow courts to 
understand the economic relationship within the microcosm of crowdsourcing and not just in 
general terms of financial dependence.   
V. WORK OR LEISURE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CLICK-“WORK” 
 
Courts have yet to apply traditional labor and employment laws to a crowdsourcing 
context.
176
  A court-based solution for crowdsourcing need not start from scratch as the FLSA 
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litigation in other areas is helpful.
177
  Overall, the identifiable trend of court approaches was to 
adopt a case-by-case, fact-sensitive approach.
178
  Courts seek to determine the reality of the 
situation and understand the nuances of various employer-employee relationships.  The fact that 
crowdsourcing takes place in a virtual work forum does not change this premise.  By drawing on 
current court-imposed analyses and crafting factors specific to an online environment, the courts 
will be aided in getting to the reality of the situation.   
While the labor struggles of the past are carried forward in the digital age through 
crowdsourcing, not every instance necessarily mandates FLSA protection.  For this reason, it 
does not suffice to say that crowdsourcing, in all forms, is either work or leisure.  It is important 
to identify the exact type of clicker that is in need of FLSA coverage and avoid capturing de 
minimus instances of click-work.
179
  It is a matter of properly constructing the drag-net.  For 
example, it is not the goal of fairness to regulate the crowdsourcing activity of a psychology 
professor using crowdsourcing to conduct a study.  To properly screen, the court should begin 
with the goal of regulation in this instance: achieving fairness for clickers.  With that goal in 
mind, the court should embark on the kind of factor-based approach seen in other areas of 
employment law—of course, these factors would be tailored to virtual work.       
In applying a set of factors, courts should divide the analysis into two prongs, one 
approaching the situation from that of the worker and another from that of the employer.  The 
implications on each actor will help the court come to an objective decision as to the work-
leisure distinction.  The third actor, the platform vendor, likely does not have a tremendous 
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impact on the work relationship.  The vendor’s involvement could change in the future, but as it 
stands, the vendor takes a profit and provides a means.
180
    
Lastly, Ohio labor and employment attorney Sara Witt adds an interesting catch-all 
factor: consider the policy implications and the legislative history support. 
181
  In other words, 
Witt asks whether or not the consequences of granting “employee” status are favorable from a 
policy standpoint, and whether the consequences serve the underlying purpose of the relevant 
legislation.
182
  While intended for the NLRA, this factor works in an FLSA analysis.  It gives the 
court leeway in assessing the situation while keeping a watchful eye on the larger public good.  
Thus, the court would be able to look at the extent to which an employer is exploiting clickers 
from a policy perspective which may be helpful considering there is no other litigation on 
crowdsourcing.    
A. The Clicker’s Perspective:  
 
Under this category, the court places itself in the shoes of the clicker, but does so 
cautiously as many clickers view their activities as leisure.  The court should first consider the 
amount of money earned through clicking.  This is not to say that wealth is a sign of “work” in 
all situations, but in click-work, it is less important to protect the penny-earners unless the 
clicker’s financial situation dictates otherwise.  The court should not craft its dragnet to capture 
negligible amounts.
183
  At the same time, with small amounts of compensation attached to 
clicking tasks, clickers are not able to make their first million as a clicker no matter how much 
effort they put into the clicking endeavor.
184
  The next factor—time— takes this into account.  
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Next, courts should consider the amount of time spent click-working by clickers.  For 
now, the going payment rates for these tasks are considerably low—pennies in many instances.  
By including time as a clarifying factor to the amount earned, a fuller picture can be ascertained.  
It may be that a clicker earned $10 in a day conducting click-work.  With just that fact, a court 
may not give it a second thought for protection as definable “work” under the FLSA.  
Nevertheless, suppose it took that worker upwards of five hours to earn that $10.00.  Now the 
court is able to tell that this worker earned $2 per hour while devoting significant time to the 
task.  A reasonable arbiter would be able to deduce a notion of unfairness in this situation.
185
  
This is the type of clicker whose value needs protection.  Thus, time as a factor gives the court a 
measuring stick by which it can contextualize the amount earned performing click-work.  Again, 
the key is cautious contextualization when approaching the issue from the side of the clicker.  
Time spent click-working and income earned as a result cannot be viewed in a vacuum.  
This is the crux of the analysis and the factor that gets to the core of this Comment.  Courts 
should contextualize click-work time and income with income derived from other sources such 
as a traditional “desk job.”  This inquiry will help the court ascertain whether clicking is being 
used to meaningfully support one’s livelihood.  In line with this factor, courts should consider 
the subjective intentions of the clicker.  Do the clickers themselves consider it work or play?  
While gamification may influence the answer to that question, it is worth it for the court to 
inquire.  Of course, the other factors are used to contextualize the subjective intentions of a 
clicker.  For example, an attorney making $160,000 per year who completes crowdsourcing tasks 
for what he claims is to supplement his income does not come off as very genuine.  That 
attorney’s next meal is not premised on the day’s take in crowdsourcing.       
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Consider two scenarios where differently situated individuals earn the same amount of 
money through click-work.  Suppose that same attorney makes $160,000 per year at a law firm 
and earns $500 per year through click-work.  Further suppose that a secretary earning $35,000 
per year also earns $500 per year through click-work.  Both spent the same amount of time to 
earn the $500.  To the attorney, the click-work income is only .031% of total income.  To the 
secretary, the click-work income represents 1.42% of total income.  The $500 to the attorney 
may be the difference in flying coach or first class on his vacation while to the secretary it may 
very well be the case that $500 is a needed bump to help make the rent at the end of the month.  
Even if that attorney thinks of it as work, the law need not be triggered to provide a fairer value 
for his time and efforts.  Even if the secretary regarded the clicking as play, it is in the interest of 
the law to protect that class of worker from exploitation since the income is being used for 
necessities.  In this way, this approach embraces the financial dependence factor.
186
   
A tempting factor taken from the law on unpaid internships is whether the intern has 
displaced a regular employee.  In the crowdsourcing context, this factor would manifest itself as 
whether a task would normally be distributed to an already employed member of a company.  
This factor is on point in understanding work exploitation, but it runs the risk of delving too far 
into the private decisions of businesses.  Further, clicker tasks are relatively simple in that they 
could theoretically always be distributed to already paid employees.  As such, this inquiry 
provides no enlightenment for courts at this time and should not be considered in the analysis.  
B. Focusing on the Employer: A Benefits Test 
 
Another indicator of “work” could be the benefit received by the employer.187  If an 
employer posts a task that is highly beneficial in the amalgam, that is, it carries great worth 
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compared to what the employer is paying a clicker, this would suggest an injustice.  In keeping 
with the goal of protecting clickers, these uneven equations would serve as red flags.  Especially 
in the case of gamification strategies by businesses, the employer benefit can help strip some 
layers of manipulation to reach the underlying profit-making, exploitative motives.   
Suppose company X needs a necessary but tedious project completed.  The project 
involves no particular skillset and can be easily divided into pieces.  Keeping the project in-
house would tangle valuable personnel resources and outsourcing the project would cost upwards 
of $50,000.  Instead, the company posts five thousand tasks on a crowdsourcing platform.  Each 
task would take approximately 45 minutes and pay $0.20 for completion.  In total, the project’s 
completion would cost the company $1,000.  By availing themselves of clickers, company X has 
effectively circumvented labor and employment laws while saving themselves a heap of money.  
In this situation, there seems to be a great injustice based on the enormous benefit received to the 
company compared to the clicker’s return.  If there is little benefit to a company, the task is less 
likely to sound in “work” and more likely to function as leisure.  For example, suppose a 
psychology professor is conducting an experiment and requires 1,000 participants.  The professor 
uses crowdsourcing to gain quick access to a participant pool and pays each person fifty cents for 
the fifteen minutes it took to complete his survey.  Here, the benefit received by the professor is 
merely the fulfillment of his study.  Clickers conducting tasks of this sort may be less likely to fit 
into the “work” classification due to the small benefit derived from the clicker’s input.  
Nevertheless, the case of small employer benefit does not necessarily construe a leisure activity.  
It could simply be the nature of the project, a necessary part of a greater scheme for a company.  
This is where the clicker focused factors might add needed meaning to the relationship of a small 
benefit click-work relationship.  
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It is important to be wary of extending the benefits received factor into unreasonable 
attenuation.
188
  The courts would need to limit this factor to the somewhat immediate benefits of 
utilizing clickers.  Suppose the project enabled Company X to move forward with a larger 
initiative where they would ultimately profit $2 million in a one year period.  This kind of benefit 
might be too disconnected from the click-work to warrant consideration.  For this reason, the 
benefit received may need to be tempered by what the employer would need to otherwise outlay 
had crowdsourcing not been used.     
As for the platform vendors, crowdsourcing has not yet evolved enough so as to find a 
proper place for platform vendors in this analysis of “work.”  As it stands, crowdsourcing cannot 
take place without the vendor, but they have little bearing on the work relationship that the court 
needs to discern.  Vendors provide the means.  That is not to say this will not change as 
crowdsourcing continues to grow and vendor interests are further reflected in their operation of 
platform sites.  If platform sites become more involved in the work-leisure distinction, perhaps 
more emphasis can be placed on their existence.  Notably, vendors do set the terms of use vis-à-
vis a user agreement.
189
  Until the law can catch up to these largely one-sided boiler plate 
agreements, it is not yet worth considering their language for purposes of determine whether 
crowdsourcing constitutes FLSA “work.”  In many instances, the agreements dispel liability and 
any kind of employer-employee relationship between parties.  The language has yet to be tested 
and is considered controversial along with shrink-wrap agreements in general.
190
  Largely, 
platform vendors and their user agreements will become very relevant in a discussion on the 
application of other provisions of the FLSA, that is, the employee versus independent contractor 
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dispute and the minimum wage issue discussed earlier, to name a few.
191
  As for the work versus 
leisure distinction of the FLSA, the vendors provide the means of task accessibility and 
completion and do not affect the nature of the tasks. 
 
C. Applying the Test 
 
Returning to the Chinese gold farmers for purposes of this analysis, the clicker’s 
perspective is first examined.  First, considering the amount of money earned and time spent 
earning it, a typical gold farmer earns about 30 cents per hour and works approximately 84 hours 
per week.
192
  Keeping in mind that China has no national minimum wage system, a gold farmer’s 
take is $25.20 per week for working over twice as long as the typical forty hour work week.  
Given the time spent on this activity, it is clear that this is intended as a means of primary 
income.  Moving to personal intent, many of these gold farmers enjoy the job as they get to play 
a computer game for a living— one farmer even stated that it appeals to his “playful attitude.”193  
But enjoyment aside, it would seem a job, even a lifestyle, more than anything else to these gold 
farmers.  Further, considering the other circumstances surrounding the gold farming, they have 
no other sources of income.  They even live on-site and work long twelve hour shifts.      
Switching perspectives to the employer benefit test, businesses of this sort take in 
approximately $80,000 per year.
194
  The boss to whom a gold farmer reports will make about 
$3.00 for every $1.25 the farmer makes by selling them to a retailer.
195
  That retailer will then 
pass on those hundred coins to an American and European market where they will be sold for 
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approximately $20.  Since it is unfair to extend a benefit analysis too far into perpetuity, the 
benefit inquiry will end when the coins are sold to the resellers.  Assuming there are about 24 
workers in this hypothetical gold farm, the business will have to pay out about $31,450 to gold 
farmers, leaving $48,550 to the business.  Said another way, one worker will make about $1,310 
per year.  Evidently, the employer is benefiting tremendously from the burdensome input by 
farmers and not giving them a fair return.  As for public policy, calling this play would negate 
about 100,000 of these profiting operations across China and buy into the gamification of 
labor—here, where people labor in an actual game.  Calling it work would move beyond the 
gamification and the enjoyment derived from playing World of Warcraft to find an environment 
in need of regulation.
196
  Generally, this activity seems to be regarded as an income source by the 
farmers despite enjoying the gameplay on some level.  Judging by the overwhelming amount of 
time spent at this activity and the huge benefit given to employers relative to the farmers’ return 
compensation, this would likely be classified as work.   
The gold farmer case is similar to the full-time babysitter without other means of 
financial support.  Similarly, the babysitter completes crowdsourcing tasks as a means of 
supplementing the babysitting income.  To this particular clicker, clicking could mean the 
difference between putting something in savings at the end of each month and living pay check 
to paycheck.  In a more extreme version, clicking may give the babysitter the last part of a hefty 
rent payment.  Looking at the income earned, the babysitter makes $15.00 per hour for 8 hours 
per day—$30,000 per year.  She is a clicker for 20 hours per week, usually making about $9.00 
during each hour spent clicking—that is another $9,000 per year, nearly one third of the 
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babysitting salary.   As for the employer benefit, the pennies the babysitter makes completing a 
task is minute compared to the benefit received to Company X, especially when there are 
hundreds or thousands of clickers under their short-lived but profitable employ.  Finally, the 
public policy and legislative intent factor dictate that it is in the public good to have this 
particular person protected from a “play” classification.  She is clearly using crowdsourcing to 
acquire the most basic necessities—food, shelter, clothing, and even the ability to take an unpaid 
day off.  The internet could potentially be a place where those who otherwise would be limited to 
traditional income earning opportunities would be able to make a better life for themselves 
without more schooling, training, or self-investment other than time and a computer.  Like the 
gold farmer, this clicker too is in need of a better return for her work.  
Finally, consider the high school student who babysits and uses crowdsourcing for 
enjoyment.  While all expenses are paid for by her parents, she makes $15 per hour two days per 
week watching an infant for five hours until the child’s mother or father returns home from 
work.  At the end of most weeks, she had earned approximately $150 to spend recreationally.  
Aside from the babysitting job, she uses crowdsourcing recreationally—about 10 hours—to earn 
another $10 per week.  In this case, she does not earn very much money from babysitting and her 
crowdsourcing income, putting aside its intended purpose as entertainment, is 1/16 of her total 
income.  The firm receiving the benefit here is clearly profiting disproportionately by paying the 
babysitter about $1 per hour for her efforts.  This case is different, however, than the gold 
farmers.   In the gold farm case, workers relied on that gaming income for their livelihoods.  If 
they did not perform, they did not have a place to live or something to eat.  Here, the babysitter 
could forgo all income earning activities, and aside from a slap on the wrist from her parents, she 
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still lives comfortably under her parents’ care.  The test is crafted to catch this kind of user in the 
dragnet of individuals who do not require legal intervention as would the gold farmer.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Crowdsourcing is a way for firms to access thousands of workers via the internet in a fast 
and inexpensive way.  Firms break down a project into thousands of tasks and distribute it to 
clickers using a crowdsourcing platform such as Amazon Mechanical Turk.  The clickers then 
complete simple tasks that will later be collected and pieced together by a computer.   These 
clickers are paid pennies for their time.  As it stands, an employer can utilize this virtual work 
forum to acquire labor without the cost of hiring a laborer.  An instance regulatory arbitrage, 
firms are able to circumvent the labor and employment laws that are in place to protect against 
these situations.  The issue is fairness to the clicker, that is, the clicker ought to get fair value 
back from the firm for their input of work.  This is an injustice that must be ended by applying 
the FLSA in the crowdsourcing context and construing this activity as “work.” 
While the FLSA provides basic protections to workers, those protections have not been 
applied to clickers by courts or the legislature.  In order for the FLSA to apply, crowdsourcing 
must be considered “work” for purposes of the FLSA.  Notably, the FLSA does not provide a 
definition of “work” to distinguish it from “leisure.”  Should crowdsourcing fall into the “work” 
category, the protections of the FLSA would be in effect pending resolution of other FLSA 
issues.  Nevertheless, as courts and legislatures move closer to addressing clicking, a work 
classification scheme must be created to meet the demands and innovations of virtual work 
forums.   
Compensable time, on-call time, and unpaid internships, areas where the Court has 
considered the work/play distinction, offer a thoughtful paradigm under which to view 
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crowdsourcing.  Importantly, not every instance of crowdsourcing should be considered “work.”  
There may very well be instances where clicking is a leisure activity for the clicker.  Drawing on 
factors used in other FLSA cases, a case-by-case factor-based approach should be used to craft 
the dragnet.  By looking at the income earned as a result of click-work, the amount of time spent 
conducting click-work, the clicker’s financial and living arrangements and the benefit to the 
employer, courts can begin to assess whether the click-work is ripe for FLSA protection beyond 
the complication of gamification.   
As virtual work continues to gain momentum, these issues will become ever more 
pressing on the courts and legislature.  Courts will have to navigate the complex application of 
traditional employment and labor laws to virtual forums.  There is much legal technicality to sort 
through in applying these labor and employment laws to virtual work forums, but the courts and 
legislature should approach the issue with fairness to the worker as the foremost concern.   
 
 
